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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 15/03/2004 Accident number: 315 
Accident time: 10:45 Accident Date: 24/12/1999 




Primary cause: Victim inattention (?) Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Vegetation removal 
accident 
Date of main report: 29/12/1999 
ID original source: MT/AR Name of source: CND/IND/MT 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: bushes/scrub 
grass/grazing area 
pylons and surrounds 
sparse trees 
wet 
Date record created: 20/02/2004 Date  last modified: 20/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate communications (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
vegetation clearance problem (?) 
pressure to work quickly (?) 
1 
inadequate equipment (?) 
 
Accident report 
An accident report on an IND form was made available by IND. Written in Portuguese, the 
investigator did not fill in all of the fields and did not sign or date the report. The report was 
translated and is transcribed here as accurately as possible. It is followed by a demining 
group internal report. 
 
Accident report 1 
The weather at the time of the accident was described as “hot and sunny”. 
 
Description of Accident 
The accident occurred at 10:45 on December 24th 1999 during the manual demining of power 
lines between Maputo and Komatiport at the 88th tower about 8km from Moamba Town. The 
area being cleared was very muddy with lots of shrubs and grass around the pylon. 
The deminer was injured in an area considered to be densely mined during an attempt to 
enlarge the cleared area from 20 square metres to 40 square metres. While trying to cut 
some shrubs he made a "false move" and activated a mine outside his lane with his left foot. 
The mine was outside the "ring" and below a tree.  
 
A photograph of the accident site is shown above. 
The accident happened on Christmas Eve and, according to the management, the group 
working on this assignment was a part of a number of volunteers who had agreed to forego 
their Christmas and New Year holiday. 
As a result of the accident the injured deminer lost his life on the way to Zimbabwe after 
receiving treatment at Sommerchild Hospital.  
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended: 
The demining group must put in place measures which guarantee the safety of deminers. In 
this regard they have to introduce the mandatory use of protective vests.  
From now on, the demining group must acquire an ambulance and not use alternative 





The accident was unavoidable due to the squatting posture of the victim when he was 
working, which did not give him much room for movement. The one movement he made to 
make more room for work resulted in the accident. 
The most serious injuries caused by the mine were mainly due to the demining group not 
providing their deminers with protective vests. 
Pressure put on the deminers to finish the lane in "record time" and "obliging" them to work as 
volunteers are one of the factors which contributed to the accident. 
Four colour photographs were included in the file showing: 
• Tower No. 88 where the accident occurred 
• The deminer's lane 
• The site of the accident 
• The crater left by the explosion of the mine 
[From the report above, several inferences have been drawn with reasonable confidence: The 
victim stood on a mine that detonated properly, so probably lost a foot. The victim’s injuries 
would have been less if he had a protective vest, so he suffered chest or body injury. The 
mine involved was an AP blast mine.] 
 
Accident report 2 
A report dated 29th December written by the Field Manager at the site was also made 
available by IND in 2000. The following summarises its content. 
The cover sheet recorded that the mine involved was a PMN. Other sources report that 3000 
Gyata-64s had been found on the job. Given that the mines are similar in appearance, the 
GYATA-64 may have been mistaken for a PMN. 
The victim’s injuries were recorded as: “Left foot completely blown off. Right lower leg 
suffered severe lacerations and damage” 
At about 11:20 the Field Manager returned from a routine recce and was informed of the 
accident that had occurred at 10:45. He drove to intercept the vehicle being used for 
medevac. He looked at the victim and decided that he would be more comfortable remaining 
where he was because a stretcher would not fit into his own vehicle. The two vehicles drove 
by a pre-planned route (avoiding bottlenecks) to Maputo arriving at the outskirts by 12:30. 
“During the journey” the Field Manager was told that a medevac aircraft would collect the 
casualty from Maputo airport at 14:30. The Field Manager contacted a special clinic in Maputo 
to arrange to be met on arrival by an ambulance. The ambulance met the evacuation vehicle 
and the casualty was transferred by 12:45. 
The Field Manager sent the medic into the clinic with the victim while he telephoned the 
group’s director. The medic was not allowed into the ward. The Field Manager entered by the 
emergency door and located the victim in the Intensive Care ward where he was being 
stabilized in preparation for the journey to the airport. His left-leg bandages were reinforced. 
“The right leg dressings had been removed and the lacerations were worse than I had hitherto 
realized and he had lost a lot of blood”. The victim was in pain, especially when his legs were 
moved. 
The wounds were being dressed by an orthopaedic surgeon. All efforts were directed to 
stabilizing the victim. However, the medical staff made it clear that they would prefer to 
operate. “I asked whether he could manage the journey and they told me that he could but 
there was a risk that he might not. On this basis we proceed with the transfer to the airport.” 
There was confusion at the airport but when that was overcome the medevac doctor said that 
the victim “was in a bad way but should make it to Harare”. While waiting for the plane to 
refuel and the papers to be signed the medevac doctor reported to the Field Manager that the 
victim had “gone into shock and should not travel”. The Field Manager informed the Director 
of Operations and the victim was taken back to the clinic in the ambulance at about 15:00. 
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The Field Manager returned to the clinic at 15:20 to find that the victim was gasping for breath 
and losing consciousness. The victim died at 15:50, still in the intensive care ward. 
The Field Manager returned to the accident site on the following day where “it was evident 
that he had stepped on a PMN mine whilst clearing around a tree at the end of his lane”. 
The victim had been previously trained but only started with the group three weeks before the 
accident. He had detected an M969 on his first day and a PMD-6 subsequently. A week 
before the accident he was “warned” when two metal fragments were found by his Team 
Leader in the area he was supposed to have cleared.   
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 397 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 5 hours 
Protection issued: Not recorded Protection used: not recorded 
 




Leg Below knee 
FATAL 
COMMENT 
No medical report was made available. Victim died 5 hours and 5 minutes after the accident. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Victim inattention” because it seems that the 
victim stepped out of the cleared area inadvertently as he cut undergrowth. The secondary 
cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment” because the victim was not provided with 
protective equipment and died en-route to a hospital in a neighbouring country. His medevac 
began in a long trip in a vehicle that was not an ambulance and when he arrived in a trauma 
clinic capable of operating, it was decided to move him again by air to Harare instead. It is 
unclear why this was considered desirable.  
It is management’s responsibility to provide adequate equipment and medevac facilities. 
There was no adequate ambulance, no adequate PPE and no adequate communications 
equipment. 
The independent report on the accident was poorly detailed and failed to identify the mine or 
the PPE in use (if any). 
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